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abstract: In the english-language reception of alain Badiou’s work, he has often been one-
sidedly positioned as a direct heir to the antihumanist projects of lacan, althusser and foucault. 
whilst there is much to this claim, this paper argues that the retention of a notion of the ‘political 
subject’ in Badiou’s work necessarily also depends upon a commitment to a much-underex-
amined notion of a minimal philosophical anthropology that puts Badiou in a tradition with 
thinkers such as ludwig feuerbach. It is further argued that Badiou’s minimal philosophical 
anthropology is opposed in essence to apparently similar phenomenological projects because it 
aligns humanity with infinity and not finitude.
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InTroducTIon
against the evacuation of any positive use of the term in althusser’s work and its re-
duction to mere ideological effect, it is clear that Badiou wants to retain a post-sartrean 
conception of the ‘subject’, and that this has been the case from his earlier, more heavily 
political, works (Théorie du sujet from 1982), to his later exercises in meta-ontology and a 
theory of truth (Being and Event, 1988 and Logiques des mondes, 2006). 
however, we can immediately complicate this claim by further stating that the later 
Badiou does take on board one aspect of the althusserian claim that there are no extant 
‘subjects’ qua autonomous agents alongside the seemingly opposed sartrean idea that 
subjectivation is possible and, indeed, desirable. Badiou’s relationship to the claims and 
vicissitudes of the so-called humanism-antihumanism debate play out over the question 
of how and why he retains and defines, not just a question of who or what the collective 
political subject might be, but also what the significance of the ‘subject’ might be for 
philosophy in toto. his work is an attempt to merge and go beyond the two terms of the 
debate, in which structuralism ‘opposes’ humanism, by entering into a topological dis-
course that nevertheless permits the continued possible existence of the subject (indeed, 
we could say that Badiou’s preservation of the ‘subject’ is the most consistent element 
of his work). whilst Badiou seeks to align himself with the antihumanism of foucault, 
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lacan and althusser, against both a ‘return to Kant’ in human rights discourse and the 
‘bad darwinism’ of a contemporary conception of man as finite animal, there are hints, 
both explicit and implicit, of his belonging to a longer trajectory of ‘political human-
ism’. Indeed, we will see this in particular in Badiou’s mathematico-political deployment 
of terms such as ‘generic’, and its political correlate ‘generic humanity’. It will not be 
argued that Badiou’s ‘mathematical turn’ is necessarily over-determined by his politics, 
as some have suggested, but rather that the mathematics and politics co-implicate each 
other in ways that entail that when Badiou uses terms like ‘revolution’ the resonances 
are intended to be heard at both levels, scientific and historico-political. 
The major claim made here is that Badiou’s use of the term ‘humanism’ is, however, 
evidence of a political struggle whose vicissitudes have leant the philosophical implica-
tions of the word a different sense at different points between the original ‘debate’ of the 
1960s and the contemporary era: the story here with regard to Badiou’s work is how the 
impossibility of using the term in the era of stalin (‘a “soviet humanism” through which 
we can glimpse the well-heeled dachas and the black Mercedes’.1) has been transformed 
into the possibility of equating the quasi-feuerbachian term ‘generic humanity’ with the 
politics of an egalitarian communism (‘equality means that the political actor is repre-
sented under the sole sign of the uniquely human capacity’2). 
also at stake in this article is an attempt to confront some of the early english-lan-
guage reception of Badiou’s philosophy of the subject as a contemporary continuation 
of the cartesian project. This is a reading primarily promulgated by Žižek in his The 
Ticklish Subject, where he is explicit in his attempt to ‘reassert’ the cartesian subject, and 
enlists Badiou in this endeavour by aligning him on his side in the war against those 
who would oppose ‘the hubris of so-called cartesian subjectivity’. This article, on the 
other hand, will take seriously Badiou’s claim in Meditation Thirty-seven of Being and 
Event where he writes: ‘The “there is” of the subject is the coming-to-being of the event, 
via the ideal occurrence of a truth, in its finite modalities. By consequence, what must 
always be grasped is that there is no subject, that there are no longer some subjects. 
what lacan still owed to descartes, a debt whose account must be closed, was the idea 
that there were always some subjects’. what Žižek downplays in Badiou is the fact that 
it is precisely not a question of the psychoanalytic subject (as it surely must remain the 
case for Žižek in his project to rehabilitate lacan), which is why the latter must preserve 
the idea that Badiou remains in some sense cartesian, or post-cartesian in a neverthe-
less strictly indebted manner, and thus partly lacanian in the way that Žižek desires: 
‘The subject is strictly correlative with the ontological gap between the universal and 
1. alain Badiou, Théorie du Sujet , paris, seuil, 1982, p. 201 (henceforth Ts). all translations are my own with 
the kind help of alberto Toscano.
2. alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. jason Barker, london, Verso, 2005, p. 97 (henceforth M).
. slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, london, Verso, 1999, p. 12.
. alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. oliver feltham, london, ny, continuum, 2005, p.  (henceforth 
Be).
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the particular’.5 whilst Žižek does recognize a split between Badiou and lacan on the 
question of the identification of the subject with the void (imperative for psychoanalysis, 
but an illegitimate ‘ontologization’ for Badiou), he nevertheless aligns Badiou with a phi-
losophy of subjective decisionism, on the model of a psychoanalytic ‘act’: ‘for Badiou 
… the subject is cosubstantial with a contingent act of decision’.6 The problem with this 
conflation is that, whilst it represents a common criticism of Badiou, it makes Badiou’s 
position a kind of voluntarism (see the section on Badiou and schmitt below), which has 
indeed been one of the charges levelled against Badiou in his initial english language-
reception. contra Žižek, I seek here to unpack Badiou’s own definition of a subject, in 
particular, his notion of a political subject, which pays attention to and defends its col-
lective, procedural and organized nature.
But what, to begin with, of Badiou’s own philosophical concessions to cartesianism? 
In his monograph on deleuze, Badiou himself analyses the reasons why the latter can-
not uphold any kind of cartesianism, even though descartes does not appear to have 
any ostensible recourse to ‘the transcendence of principles’, a position to which deleuze 
would otherwise appear committed. Badiou presents a series of reasons why deleuze 
cannot be aligned with a ‘philosophy of the subject’: that the principle of the univoc-
ity of being precludes the primacy of the subject, which can only reverberate within 
the confines of equivocity, body-soul, being-nothingness, extension-thought (and here 
deleuze is close to heidegger’s opposition to the metaphysics of the subject); that the 
subject is predicated on a certain reflexive negativity that is again precluded by a pri-
oritization of the univocity of Being, which cannot abide negativity; that philosophies 
of the subject place the operator ‘subject’ within a scientific paradigm (the relationship 
between the cogito and galileanism); that a certain reactionary tendency towards the 
capitalist-parliamentary model of politics generally brings with it a commitment to a 
moral and humanitarian subject.7 In place of these four criticisms of the subject, Badiou 
argues that deleuze replaces their starting-points with a different model: that of the fold, 
the ‘auto-affection of the outside’ where thinking coincides with Being: ‘It is remark-
able that one can name this identity “subject” without having conceded anything to the 
cartesian filiation. for to be a subject is “to think the outside as time, on the condition 
of the fold”’ (d 90). The problem for Badiou with this ‘escape-route’ from subjectivity is 
its identification of thought with the one of being, the aestheticization of ‘folding’, and 
its consequent political and philosophical inadequacy: for deleuze in the end ‘what 
always matters is folding, unfolding, refolding’,8 the mere performance of the expres-
sion of univocal Being. whilst Badiou will of course retain the language of subject and 
subjectivation, it is imperative that this subject not be understood as an individuated 
thinking or doubting entity, i.e. as classically ‘cartesian’. for Badiou, it is clear that some 
5. Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, p. 158.
6. Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, p. 159.
7. all these points are taken from Badiou’s Deleuze: The Clamor of  Being, trans. louise Burchill, Minneapolis, 
london, university of Minnesota press, 2000, pp. 80-81 (henceforth d).
8. gilles deleuze, The Fold, trans. Tom conley, london, ny, continuum, 2001, p. 17.
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subjects are not conscious (the subject of a truth in art is an artwork, for example), some 
are collective (the political subject) and some are dyadic (the truth of the amorous couple 
is their separate two-ness, not the romantic ‘fusion’ itself).
as a prelude to a more detailed exploration of Badiou’s theories of the subject, 
however, it is important to set out a certain non-philosophical thread—in essence, a 
positive, active, usually Marxist ‘subject’—as it is this notion, which in part takes its cue 
from one particular element of descartes (namely the activity of the thinking thing) that 
underpins Badiou’s own conceptions and the political history of his thought. This takes 
us from a certain line of thought stretching from rousseau to dunayevskaya, before we 
turn to Badiou’s own Théorie du sujet and Being and Event. 
ultimately it will be argued that Badiou’s theory of the subject, whilst beginning 
from a primarily political problematic and broadening out into a conception that will 
also include such processes as art works (in the domain of art), mathematical innovations 
(in the domain of science) and couples (in the domain of love), nevertheless demonstrates 
certain conceptual continuities at the level both of its formalized character and proce-
dure. as Vainqueur puts it, for Badiou: ‘The subject is neither conceived as the existen-
tial place of a set of representations, nor apprehended as the transcendental system of 
the constitution of objects of possible experience, similarly, truth can no longer be envis-
aged as the adequation of subject and object’.9 It is this evacuated subject that persists in 
Badiou’s thought as the primary basis of all the truth procedures, including politics.
The acTIVe polITIcal suBjecT
Prima facie, we know that the category ‘political subject’ has, at different historical 
points, operated in completely antonymic ways: from the passive subservience of a sub-
ject (subjectum, ‘that which is kept down’—literally ‘that which is thrown underneath’), 
to the active subject, and its seizure of politics itself. This active subject, we can say, is 
largely a ‘collectivizing’ of an idea of the cartesian ‘self-subject’ in the realm of politics, 
rather than a reversal of the substantive passive qualities of an older aristotelian notion. 
however, it also bears a relation to the history of the term subjectus, namely the being 
submitted to an authority (sovereign, monarchical). when dunayevskaya writes in 1971 
that ‘[n]o word is more important than subject … whether we mean the workers or a 
single revolutionary; whether we mean women’s liberation, Blacks, Indians, “organiza-
tion,” it is clear that “subject” is the one responsible for both theory and practice’,10 there 
is no doubt that ‘subject’ is here understood as the propulsive, active, revolutionary force 
manifested by both individuals and collectives in the fusion of theory and practice. It re-
tains absolutely none of its traditional passive senses. how did the term ‘political subject’ 
9. Vainqueur, Bernard, ‘de quoi “sujet” est-il le nom pour alain Badiou?’, Penser le Multiple, paris, 
l’harmattan, 2002, pp. 1-8, p. 1.
10. raya dunayevskaya, ‘Marxist-humanism’s concept of “subject”’, letter to young members of news and 
letters committees, The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection, Supplement, 1971, pp. 1110-11. available at http://www.
marxists.org/archive/dunayevskaya/works/1971/subject.htm.
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become mediated by these two senses of the subject (the cartesian active subject and 
the political subjectus)? 
It is clear that this is not merely a theoretical question, but one that engages the 
historical invention of certain mediating terms, such as ‘people’ (peuple) and citizen 
(citoyen/ne), and certain events (the french revolution, the paris commune). Balibar 
argues, for instance, that it was only by way of the citizen ‘that universality could come 
to the subject’.11 linguistically, there is evidence in the term of a move from adjective to 
noun, from individuals who are subjected to the power of another, to the representation 
or active force of a people or a community as a set of ‘subjects’. we can contrast this 
‘political fusion’ of the cartesian subject and the subjectus with the recent hegelian and 
psychoanalytic attempt to trace another history of the subject as a prelude for a discus-
sion of radical politics, such as we find in Žižek: ‘the standard notion of the gradual 
becoming-subject of the substance (of the “active” subject leaving its “imprint” on the 
substance, moulding it, mediating it, expressing in it his subjective content) is … doubly 
misleading … [it] is always the remainder of substance which eludes grasp of “subjective 
mediation”’. 12 Žižek thus turns the question of the subject into something like a haunting 
remainder to be psychoanalytically traversed, rather than addressing the activity of a 
collective political subject in all its potential historical force. 
It is in rousseau’s 1762 text, The Social Contract, above all, that we explicitly witness 
the metamorphosis of subject in the old sense (obedience) into a new kind of subject, 
the subject of law which is, nevertheless, also the final arbiter of legal pronouncements 
and is thus active and passive to the same degree, although not yet the wholly active 
revolutionary subject of dunayevskaya’s theory and practice:1
The public person thus formed by the union of all other persons was once called 
the city, and is now known as the republic or the body politic. It its passive role it 
is called the state, when it plays an active role it is the sovereign; and when it is 
compared to others of its own kind, it is a power. Those who are associated in it take 
collectively the name of a people, and call themselves individually citizens, in that 
they share in the sovereign power, and subjects, in that they put themselves under 
the laws of the state. 1
This collective of associating beings who are simultaneously people, citizens and subjects, 
operates at the level of the law, and is neither subject to it in the more classical sense, 
nor does it impose laws from above (for it would be merely imposing them upon itself): 
‘There must be an exact correspondence between the absolute activity of the citizen 
11. etienne Balibar, ‘citizen subject’, Who Comes After the Subject?, eduardo cadava, peter connor, jean-luc 
nancy (eds.), london, routledge, 1991, p. 5. 
12. slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of  Ideology, durham, duke university 
press, 199, p. 21.
1. historically, the first recorded use of the term ‘citizen’ to mean ‘bearer of rights’ was in 1751. see Trésor 
de la Langue Française. available at http://atilf.atilf.fr/tlf.htm.
1. jean-jacques rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice cranston, london, penguin, 1968, pp. 61-
62.
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(legislation) and his absolute passivity (obedience to the law). But it is essential that this 
activity and this passivity be exactly correlative’.15 The inhabitant of such a republic splits 
himself or herself between general and particular interests, and thus inaugurates a new 
subject, as Balibar demonstrates, the citizen-subject (‘[t]he citizen properly speaking is 
neither the individual nor the collective, just as he is neither an exclusively public being nor a 
private citizen’).16 In this historical turn, there is a certain move towards informality with 
regard to the state. The term ‘citizen’, from a 12th century term meaning ‘inhabitant of 
a city’, carries with it an actual attempt to reinvent certain public forms of address—af-
ter the french revolution, a bill was issued to replace ‘Monsieur’ and ‘Madame’ with 
‘citizen’ (qua non-deferential, urbanized, generic term).17 we could perhaps call this the 
‘republicanization of thought’, which finds its rapid historical culmination in the decla-
ration of the rights of Man and of the citizen (26th august 1789): ‘article 6: legislation 
expresses the overall will’.
But what is this overall (so-called sovereign) will? In rousseau, we are presented 
with a concept of the subject mid-way between the passivity of the sovereign-subject 
and the activity of the revolutionary subject: this subject is mediated not only via the 
citizen, but also by a new conception of sovereignty. when rousseau asks ‘what then 
is correctly to be called an act of sovereignty? It is not a covenant between a superior 
and an inferior, but a covenant of the body with each of its members’,18 there is another 
circularity, not just of subject and law, but also of subject and sovereign. But how is this 
circularity determined?
It is via the conception of the ‘general will’ that the laws decided upon by subjects 
will operate equally for all: ‘since each man gives himself to all, he gives himself to no 
one; and since there is no associate over whom he does not gain the same rights as oth-
ers gain over him, each man recovers the equivalent of everything he loses, and in the 
bargain he acquires more power to preserve what he has’.19 how does the suppressed 
subject of sovereignty come to be collective? By associating in such a way as that to as-
sume one’s being subjected to the law is simultaneously one’s giving oneself to ‘no one’ 
and the recovery of one’s rights in the equal and simultaneous agreement of all. The 
social pact or contract expresses this generic, empty will, which functions by subtracting 
the sum of individual differences (the pluses and minuses of interest) in the name of a 
common claim. But why does rousseau maintain the classical link between subject and 
sovereign at all? Merely because of the traditional connotations of the concept? If the 
subject and sovereignty coincide in the legislating power of the subject as general will, 
why not dispense with the formal framework of a hierarchical political, theological and 
15. Balibar, ‘citizen subject’, p. 9.
16. Balibar, ‘citizen subject’, p. 51.
17. The question of the term ‘citizen’ is also tied up with the question of tutoiement (the informal use of ‘you’ 
in french): ‘Times that one would [use the informal form of ‘you’] and one would say: citizen’ (as in Victor 
hugo’s Les Misérables from 1862).
18. rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 77.
19. rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 61.
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monarchical system by replacing the term ‘subject’ with a completely new term?
It is perversely enlightening in this regard to turn to one of rousseau’s most reac-
tionary critics for a summary of this problem, joseph de Maistre who, in his Study on 
Sovereignty (1821), defends classical sovereignty in the following way:
It is said that the people are sovereign; but over whom?—over themselves, 
apparently. The people are thus subject. There is surely something equivocal if 
not erroneous here, for the people who command are not the people which obey … 
If a democracy in its theoretical purity were to exist, there would be no sovereignty 
within this state: for it is impossible to understand by this word anything other than 
a repressive power that acts on the subject and that is external to him. It follows that 
this word subject, which is a relative term, is alien to republics, because there is no 
sovereign, properly speaking, in a republic and because there cannot be a subject 
without a sovereign, just as there cannot be a son without a father.20
de Maistre points out a certain linguistic and structural irony in rousseau’s idea that 
‘the sovereign, which is simply a collective being, cannot be represented by anyone but 
itself ’.21 whilst de Maistre’s own conception of sovereignty is without doubt anti-philo-
sophical, theological, elitist and nationalist (a clutch of sentiments handily summarized 
in the following quote: ‘whoever says that man is born for liberty is speaking nonsense’), 
this depiction of the ‘circularity’ of subject and sovereignty in rousseau’s ‘republicani-
zation of thought’ is important: It means that the political subject, as egalitarian and as 
generic, is perilously close, etymologically and in practice, to tipping back into forms 
of despotism. rousseau himself recognizes this possibility very clearly: ‘if the danger is 
such that the apparatus of law is itself an obstacle to safety, then a supreme head must be 
nominated with power to silence all the laws and temporarily suspend the sovereign au-
thority’.22 we are thus left with an odd formula that at any moment potentially replaces 
the old sovereign (i.e. the will of the people expressed through law and subject to those 
laws) with a new ‘supreme head’. The moment the subject and law slip out of alignment 
with each other is the moment a novel, perhaps even more despotic, form of authority 
could fill the breach. This scenario is reflected in this retort to rousseau, again from de 
Maistre: ‘people complain of the despotism of princes; they ought to complain of the 
despotism of man’.2 whilst de Maistre promulgates a form of naturalized politics, which 
emphasizes tradition and divine purpose: ‘all sovereignty derives from god; whatever 
form it takes, it is not the work of man’,2 de Maistre’s criticisms of rousseau neverthe-
less point to the fundamental difficulty of reversing the meaning of the term subject 
20. joseph de Maistre,The Works of  Joseph de Maistre, trans. and with an introduction by jack lively, london, 
allen and unwin, 1965, p. 120.
21. Maistre,The Works, p. 69.
22. rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 171.
2. Maistre, ‘study on sovereignty’, in The Works, p. 118
2. Maistre, ‘study on sovereignty’, in The Works, p. 11. compare rousseau’s incidentally pre-emptive 
response: ‘all power comes from god … but so does every disease, and no one forbids us to summon a 
physician’. The Social Contract, p. 5.
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from a politically submissive entity (either collective or singular) to an active self-regulat-
ing collective noun, namely the ‘people’, the ‘citizens’ (we could call this the question of a 
subject-predicate reversal within the term subject itself). This difficulty remains in so far 
as the political subject is mediated by the concept of the sovereign, since the sovereign 
structures the entire space and placing of that which is contained in the political frame-
work, namely the subjects therein. It is the destruction of what he will call this ‘space of 
placements’ that Badiou is concerned to explicate in Théorie du sujet.
The same theo-political hierarchization that remained in descartes in his concep-
tion of man engenders difficulties for a more explicitly political project with egalitarian 
aims. when Balibar, in an explicit attempt to justify some of the egalitarian elements ap-
parent in rousseau (and compare his own project of egaliberté, where the coextensivity of 
equality and freedom immediately concerns the universality of individuals), argues the 
following: ‘[a]fter the subject comes the citizen … and whose constitution and recogni-
tion put an end (in principle) to the subjection of the subject’, there is a sense in which he 
overlooks the inherent limitations of a such a positive conception of the political subject 
and its inscription within constitutions. while it is clear, as he suggests, that one cannot 
think a modern concept of the political subject without taking into account its mediated 
role through the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘people’,25 there remains an inherent danger that 
the retention of the term ‘subject’ will leave it open to recuperation by whatever force 
desires to subordinate it. By transforming the discourse on the political subject from 
that of representation in a certain political space to a reformulation of the very question 
of ‘placement’ in politics, Badiou attempts to overcome the circular logic that would 
always leave a subject (however ‘active’) prey to recapture by the logic of the (sovereign) 
state.
BadIou, BalIBar and rousseau
It is revealing, with regard to the analysis of the terms subject, citizen and politics, to 
briefly compare Balibar and Badiou’s readings of rousseau, composed around the same 
time (and indeed published in the same year, 1988), but rather different in emphasis and 
conclusion.26 whilst acknowledging, at the outset, with Balibar, that for rousseau ‘the 
words subject and sovereign are identical correlatives’, Badiou will subsume this dyadic re-
lationship (what we could call the ‘republican democratization’ of power) under what he 
names, and will call in his own work, ‘the generic becoming of politics’. why? Because 
what he wants to unveil in rousseau is an instance of a conception of politics that mani-
fests certain key features present in Badiou’s own theory: a demand for generic equality, 
an ‘event’ in politics (in this instance, the social contract), and, above all, the idea that 
politics ‘is a creation, local and fragile, of collective humanity’. This is, in the end, the 
form of ‘political subjectivity’ that Badiou wishes to extract from rousseau, rather than 
25. Very much more could be said of this latter term ‘people’, of course: in its very origins it is ambiguous; 
it could potentially refer to ethnicity, inhabitants of a nation, a territory, etc.
26. see Balibar’s ‘citizen subject’; Being and Event was originally published 1988.
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remaining within the historical-conceptual locus of questions concerning the citizen per 
se, as Balibar does. Instead of focussing on the more classically bourgeois elements of 
rousseau’s proposals (the defence of property, security and the ‘rights’ of the state qua 
state), Badiou sees in the general will an almost pure form of ‘fidelity’ to egalitarian aims 
(‘[t]he general will is the operator of fidelity which directs a generic procedure’). The 
citizen, in this account, becomes translated as a ‘militant’ of a political cause, faithful 
(albeit precariously) to the rare emergence of an ‘event’ in politics, the social contract 
(or rather to its generic demands).27 later, Badiou will speak of the ‘militant identifica-
tion’ of politics: ‘which, for me, is … the only identification which can ally politics and 
thought’ (M 1). 
however, there are two problems here, aside from the question of whether Badiou’s 
reading of rousseau is something of a theoretical imposition. one is the instability of the 
political event itself, whereby there is an ‘inherent and inevitable vice which relentlessly 
tends to destroy the body politic from the moment of its birth’ (Be 5). In essence, this 
represents the acknowledgement that the egalitarian impulse behind the social contract 
will inevitably be corrupted. Badiou’s point here is again extremely close (and will re-
main so in his own work) to sartre’s argument in the Critique of  Dialectical Reason, namely 
that there is a kind of constitutive failure, an inevitable ossification or falling-off of the 
demands behind every revolutionary impulse and any collective project. 
The second major difficulty here is the distance between what Badiou wants to val-
orize in rousseau (the generic nature of the will, the ‘event’ of the social contract, the 
precarious creation of a ‘collective humanity’) and the way rousseau sees this in which 
the generic or general will manifested, namely through voting, the counting of each 
representation: ‘this act of association creates an artificial and corporate body composed 
of as many members as there are voters in the assembly’ and ‘for the will to be general, 
it does not have to be unanimous; but all the votes must be counted’.28 Badiou admits 
that rousseau submits the general will to the ‘law of number’ and thus turns a generic, 
egalitarian political programme into a majoritarian one. (In france, the major historical 
definition of whether one was technically an active or passive citizen was determined by 
whether the person voted or not.) If the critical question for both Badiou and rousseau 
is ultimately ‘how can the generic character of politics subsist when unanimity fails?’ 
(Be 9), with the emphasis on the genericity of politics, then rousseau clearly finds 
the answer in a form of electoral systems and majority agreement. Badiou, on the other 
hand, will turn to the concept of fidelity (and, etymologically at least, introduces a new 
version of the theological ‘faithful subject’). ultimately Badiou criticizes rousseau for 
eliding politics with legitimation (and the electoral) and not with truth. It is politics as 
a ‘truth procedure’, and the separation of truth from knowledge that grounds Badiou’s 
own presentation of politics. clearly, if the ‘general will is infallible, due to being sub-
tracted from any particular knowledge, and due to it relating solely to the generic exist-
27. The Badiou quotes are from Meditation 2 of Be, pp. -5.
28. rousseau, Social Contract, p. 61, 70.
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ence of people’ then ballot boxes and the counting of representations would seem to be a 
priori superfluous, or at least something that wouldn’t touch the ‘correctness’ of the will.29 
carl schmitt has a quite different criticism of rousseau, which nevertheless chastises 
him for something very similar to Badiou, albeit from the other side of sovereignty, as it 
were: this critique (famously) circles around the need to maintain a purer concept of 
‘decision’. schmitt argues the following: 
The general will of rousseau became identical with the will of the sovereign; 
but simultaneously the concept of the general will also contained a quantitative 
determination with regard to its subject, which means that the people become 
sovereign. The decisionistic and personalistic element in the concept of sovereignty 
was thus lost.0 
for schmitt, as we saw in the previous section for de Maistre too, it is the becoming-
anonymous of the arbitrary and idiosyncratic element of the sovereign that is at fault in 
rousseau, because it deprives the sovereign of his fundamental characteristic, namely, 
to intervene in the name of an exception (‘sovereign is he who decides on the excep-
tion’).1 similarly, again following de Maistre, schmitt points out the peculiarity of re-
taining the (originally) theologically-structured term ‘subject’ in a political context if the 
concept of sovereignty is, according to rousseau, to be dissolved into its antonym (‘The 
politicization of theological concepts [in rousseau] is so striking that it has not escaped 
any true expert on his writings’2). for schmitt, it is a question of the ‘systematic struc-
ture’ of these secularized theological concepts which renders their new ‘democratic’ use 
suspect. 
with reference to the idea of decision, whilst Badiou will separate his notion from 
the idea of the personal, arbitrary decision and fix it instead to a kind of collective 
experience of the egalitarian and generic demand of politics itself, it is clear that rous-
seau’s ultimate subsumption of the faithful and decisional character of the general will 
to representation via the electoral system also strips it of a certain purity for Badiou: ‘as 
a procedure faithful to the event-contract, politics cannot tolerate delegation or repre-
sentation’ (Be 7). It is also intriguing to note a certain similarity in the tone of both 
schmitt and Badiou’s disgust with what schmitt calls ‘technical-organization’ and what 
Badiou names ‘capital-parliamentarianism’ (and its corollary, ‘opinionism’): The core of 
29. a clear indication of Badiou’s opinion of voting can be found in Metapolitics: ‘If our knowledge of plan-
etary motion relied solely on suffrage as its protocol of legitimation, we would still inhabit a geometrical 
universe’ (M 15).
0. carl schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of  Sovereignty, trans. george schwab, cam-
bridge, The MIT press, 1985, p. 8.
1. schmitt, Political Theology, p. 5.
2. schmitt, Political Theology, p. 6. see also p. 6 ‘all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state 
are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development…but also because 
of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these 
concepts’. and also atger: ‘The prince develops all the inherent characteristics of the state by a sort of 
continual creation. The prince is the cartesian god transposed to the political world’. (Essai sur l’histoire du 
contrat social, 1906).
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the political idea, ‘the exacting moral decision’ is evaded in both the economic or ‘tech-
nical-organization’ and the political dissolves into ‘the everlasting discussion of cultural 
and philosophical-historical commonplaces’ (schmitt); ‘The essence of politics is not 
the plurality of opinions’ and his description of ‘the state … the normative threefold ar-
rangement of economic management, national assessment and democracy’ (Badiou) (M 
8). obviously there is no sense in which Badiou and schmitt share the same political 
aims—Badiou’s concept of politics consistently opposes any statist, arbitrary or person-
alist arguments, and the decisional nature of Badiou’s faithful subject is predicated on a 
certain undecidability, not sheer arbitrary will. Bosteels, for one, points to some of the 
problems with understanding Badiou’s faithful subject simply as a ‘decisionist’ concep-
tion, emphasizing instead the centrality of process and not merely the act of decision: 
‘The impure and equivocal nature of all truth processes is … inseparable from any 
topological understanding of the subject’. 
BadIou’s polITIcal suBjecTs: froM THéoRIE Du SuJET To BEINg 
AND EvENT
It is important to set out the relation between Badiou’s conceptions of force and de-
struction in the earlier work of Théorie du sujet (which consists of seminars presented from 
1975-79 with a preface from 1981) to his later (Being and Event and Metapolitics). Badiou is 
politically at his most leninist in the earlier text, both terminologically and rhetorically. 
The book is without doubt, at least in part, an attempt to come to terms with certain 
responses to the explosion and rapid recapture of the events of May ’68, as well as a 
certain reactionary moment in french political life (‘the bitter period of betrayal’ as he 
later describes it) (M xxxiv). It is also an attempt to demonstrate his distance (as well as 
his debt) to althusser in the wake of the ‘humanist controversy’.
The question of why Badiou wants to maintain a concept of the subject in the first 
place is a crucial one. whilst it is clear that he is heavily indebted both to lacan and 
to althusser for their structural analyses and their anti-humanism, he sees a danger in 
the way in which they handle the question of the subject. he writes: ‘the essence of an 
activist materialism requires … the production of a theory of the subject, which it once 
had the task of foreclosing’ (Ts 202). so whilst the ‘materialism’ of althusser and lacan 
usefully criticized certain classical, humanist conceptions of subjectivity and the subject 
at one critical juncture, there is a sense in which Badiou is unwilling to give up on the term 
in the context in which he now writes. Indeed, he speaks instead of a kind of ‘subjective 
deficiency’:
More deeply, I know that what has happened to us which is essential, in force as 
in humiliation, bears the mark of a long-term lack, whence derives the fact that, 
however sudden, the irruption is also light, whilst, as could be predicted long in 
. schmitt, Political Theology, p. 65.
. Bruno Bosteels, ‘alain Badiou’s Theory of the subject: The recommencement of dialectical Material-
ism? part II’, Pli, vol. 1, 2002, p. 205.
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advance, moral disarray is no less ineluctable. This lack is essentially subjective. It 
relates to the way in which potential forces, at the heart of the people, have been 
kept apart from their own concept. (Ts 1)5
as callinicos puts it, Badiou seeks ‘a conceptual black sheep—a materialism centred on 
a theory of the subject’.6 not only, but a materialism that allegedly takes its cue from 
hegel, as summarized by Badiou in the ironic statement: ‘we must conceive imperialist 
society not only as substance but also as subject’ (Ts 60).
Badiou sets out two political temptations, or ‘deviations’, that he argues followed the 
events of 1968: on the one side, the left deviation, a fetishism of the ‘pure’ political act 
that would have done with everything that belongs to the original situation and, on the 
other, the right deviation, the cynical denial that nothing had in fact taken place, that 
all was perfectly ‘normal’. Both of these temptations he argues, were inadequate to ex-
plain the singularity of the events, and also inadequate for an understanding of political 
subjectivity more generally. Badiou, instead, revisits hegel and introduces a notion of 
‘scission’ in order to refute both these deviations. In Théorie du sujet Badiou argues that 
there are two ‘dialectical matrices’ in hegel’s Logic. The former is covered by the term 
alienation, ‘the idea of a simple term that deploys itself in its becoming-other, to return 
into itself as a completed concept’ and the latter, a matrix whose operator is ‘scission’, 
‘and whose theme is that the only unity is a divided one’ (Ts 22). It is this second matrix 
that Badiou will use as the basis of an attempt to found a distinction between ‘some-
thing’ and ‘another thing’ (Etwas und Anderes). The repetition of the same thing posed 
twice, which Badiou will refer to as a (a as such) and ap (a at another place) introduces 
a discussion of ‘placement’ (where p is place). whilst he explicitly denies that p is to be 
understood spatially or geometrically (‘a doubling can be temporal, or even fictional’) 
(Ts 2-5), it is this split that he depends upon for his positing of a ‘constitutive scission’, 
which he formulates as a=(aap) (a is a, but also its placement as a). This ‘minimal 
difference’, he states, can also be understood as the relationship between theory and 
practice, the letter and the site in which it is marked. The dialectic is first and foremost a 
process, not of negation and the negation of the negation, but of internal division. every 
force must be split into itself and that part of it is placed, or determined by the structure 
of assigned places.7 every force thus stands in a relation of ‘internal exclusion’ as to its 
determining place: ‘as the history of the twentieth century shows in excruciating detail, 
what happens actually is the constant struggle of the working class against its determina-
5. In an interview from 2001, Badiou makes the following claim, with reference to his own work in the late 
1960s and 70s: ‘I found in sartre’s theory of practical freedom, and particularly in the subjectivized Marx-
ism that he was trying to produce, something with which to engage myself politically, in spite of everything, 
in the situation’, ‘can change be Thought?’, 2001 interview with Bruno Bosteels, in Alain Badiou: Philosophy 
and its Conditions, ed. and with an introduction by gabriel riera, new york, suny, 2005, p. 22.
6. alex callinicos, The Resources of  Critique, cambridge, polity: 2006, p. 9. This is one of the chapter head-
ings in Badiou’s Ts.
7. see Bruno Bosteels, ‘alain Badiou’s Theory of the subject’, p. 176. 
cosMos and hIsTory198
tion by the bourgeois capitalist order, an order that divides the proletariat from within’.8 
Bosteels repeatedly stresses the dialectical thread of Badiou’s work as a whole, refusing 
to understand the title of Being and Event, for example, as the presentation of two disjunct 
areas, rather, ‘Badiou’s later thought remains dialectical, despite the mathematical turn, 
in rejecting such stark opposition between being and event, in favour of the specific site 
through which an event is anchored in the ontological deadlock of a situation that only 
a rare subjective intervention can unlock’.9 It is the process of ‘internal division’, as set 
out in Badiou’s heavily politicized reading of hegel’s Logic, that founds his claims about 
the subject: his analysis falls somewhere between a structural presentation and a more 
classically Marxist one (such as dunayevskaya or lukács) that would always stress the 
importance of retaining a post-hegelian notion of the subject. In retaining a notion of 
the subject, however, Badiou nevertheless does not take up a notion of history, as sartre 
would do, as a way of placing this subject. In fact, Badiou aligns ‘history’ on the side of 
the objective, structural, reactionary drive to place in the negative sense: ‘it is always in 
the interests of the powerful that history is mistaken for politics—that is, that the objec-
tive is taken for the subjective’ (Ts 60). his position on this, at least, does not radically 
alter in the later work: ‘There are only plural instances of politics, irreducible to one 
another, and which do not comprise any homogeneous history’ (M 2).
In Théorie du sujet Badiou goes further in these paradoxical non-spatial, anti-histori-
cal claims regarding place. when he states that ‘the true contrary of the proletariat is 
not the bourgeoisie. It is the bourgeois world … the project of the proletarian, its inter-
nal being, is not to contradict the bourgeois … Its project is communism and nothing 
else. That is to say, the abolition of all place in which one could deploy something like 
a proletariat. The political project of the proletariat is the disappearance of the space of 
placement of classes’ (Ts 25-6), there is a clear sense in which the (non)space of politics 
is what is at stake, the complete overturning of the subjective alignment of class posi-
tions, of the very opposition proletariat-bourgeoisie. There is a double play on the terms 
subjective and objective in Théorie du sujet: not only must political subjectivity be posited 
as an active force in the face of the seemingly static nature of the existing order, but 
‘subjective’ is also opposed to the apparently ‘objective’ basis of placement, in the sense 
of an understanding of class as a social ‘object’—the total number of people who would 
‘count’ as ‘the working class’, for example. Turning to Badiou’s claim that ‘there is only 
one subject, so there is only one force, whose existence always produces the event’ (Ts 
160), we must ask: why only one? In this early conception of politics, it is a question, 
not of a conception of politics as a battle, taking place in history (as in late sartre), but, 
again, of place. The proletariat is not opposed to the bourgeoisie in a battle over who 
owns the means of production (the bourgeoisie is thus not a ‘subject’ in the same way 
as the proletariat; there is a fundamental dissymmetry between the two classes), but, as 
Badiou puts it we must reject ‘a vision of politics as subjective duel … There is one place, 
8. Bruno Bosteels, ‘alain Badiou’s Theory of the subject’, p. 176.
9. Bruno Bosteels, ‘alain Badiou’s Theory of the subject’, p. 206.
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one subject’ (Ts 18). furthermore, as a counterweight to certain of the discourses sur-
rounding May ’68, in which running battles with the police summed up the oppositional 
structure of active politics: ‘[t]here is not only the law of capital, or only the cops. To 
miss this point means not to see the unity of the order of assigned places, its consistency’ 
(Ts 60).
ultimately it is a question of the separation between what Badiou calls l’esplace 
(‘splace’ or ‘splacement’—the neologistic combination of ‘space’ and ‘place’) and horlieu 
(‘outplace’—another neologism fusing ‘outside’ and ‘place’). ‘The dialectic is the horlieu 
against the esplace’ (Ts 18). what does this mean? for Badiou, the working class cannot 
be synonymous with the proletariat—the former is the object of a well-defined social 
and economic placement, with a set of identifiable roles and positions.0 The proletariat 
is instead the ‘active’, destructive, purifying force of the undoing of all object-placement 
(hence its primarily subjectivized nature):‘the proletariat exists wherever a political hor-
lieu is created. It is thus in purging itself that it exists. It has no existence anterior to its 
organization of political survival’ (Ts 20-5). The question for Badiou here is one of 
destroying (intended quite literally) a certain structural distribution of place. In his later 
works he will openly regret this rather violent presentation: ‘I was, I admit, a little mis-
guided in Théorie du sujet concerning the theme of destruction. I still maintained, back 
then, the idea of an essential link between destruction and novelty. empirically, novelty 
(for example, political novelty) is accompanied by destruction. But it must be clear that 
this accompaniment is not linked to intrinsic novelty; on the contrary, the latter is al-
ways a supplementation by a truth’ (Be 07). It is critical to note that the introduction 
of ‘truth’ as a category in Badiou’s later works is conceptually bound to the attempt to 
separate out his political project from the violence historically perpetrated in the name 
of communism and instead links to a different theoretical lineage, that of plato and, 
indeed, to an older concept, that of ‘justice’: ‘we shall call “justice” that through which 
a philosophy designates the possible truth of a politics’ (M 97). This self-placement in 
the political trajectory of justice and truth is also reflected in his turn from the term 
proletariat to more generic conceptions of man, thought and humanity, as we shall see. 
aside from the terms horlieu and esplace, in Théorie du sujet Badiou more broadly op-
poses the terms ‘force’ and ‘place’, such that the horlieu (outplace) is not to be understood 
as another other than a force, rather than a set location: ‘the double articulation of force 
and place’, whereby ‘the one is the loss of the other … this is Marx’s great discovery’ 
(Ts 188). Badiou goes on to say that: ‘we will call subjective those processes relative to the 
qualitative concentration of force’ (Ts 59). There is a point of comparison to be made 
here with regards to the earlier and later work on this question of force, or as it is later 
termed, forcing: in Being and Event Badiou will define forcing (a ‘fundamental law of the 
0. as hallward puts it: ‘In the early work, this distinction obtains above all in the (still dialectical) move-
ment from the working class (as object) to the proletariat (as subject)…Insofar as they are conditioned 
by their well-defined social and economic place, the working classes are the mere object of history, not its 
subject or motor’. peter hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, Minneapolis, london, university of Minnesota 
press, 200, p. .
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subject’) in the following way: ‘the belonging of [the] term of the situation to come is 
equivalent to the belonging of this term to the indiscernible part which results from the 
generic procedure’ (Be 0). what does this entail? That the indiscernible part of a 
situation, that which cannot be captured by knowledge (and Badiou will always oppose 
knowledge to truth in the later works) cannot be known to a subject, yet the ‘subject of 
truth’ ‘forces veracity at the point of the indiscernible’ (Be 11), in other words, it real-
izes an indiscernible by deciding on a truth even whilst not being certain that it belongs 
to the situation in which it is found: ‘The subject, which is the forcing production of 
an indiscernible included in the situation, cannot ruin the situation. what it can do is 
generate veridical statements that were previously undecidable’ (Be 17). The move 
from the indiscernible to the undecidable is what characterizes a faithful subject for 
the Badiou of Being and Event, and precludes any illegitimate forcing of the naming of 
the event, precisely because it is based on the indiscernible elements within a specific 
situation, not the imposition of a name from a pre-existing sum of knowledges. In the 
terminology of the later work, Badiou will put this claim with regard to knowledges in 
the following way: ‘any subset, even that cemented by the most real of interests, is a-
political, given that it can be named in an encyclopaedia. It is a matter of knowledge, 
and not of truth’ (Be 7). furthermore, ‘[a] truth is that indiscernible multiple whose 
finite approximation is supported by a subject, such that its ideality to-come, nameless 
correlate of the naming of an event, is that on the basis of which one can legitimately 
designate as subject the aleatory figure which, without the indiscernible, would be no 
more than an incoherent sequence of encyclopaedic determinants’ (Be ). It is on the 
basis of this indiscernible, not the force of a pre-named collective, that a political truth 
rests. In Théorie du sujet, Badiou claims, however, that ‘every subject is political’1, and it 
is not unfair to ask whether this is still the case to some extent, or at least whether the 
structure of subjectivation in Badiou is primarily conditioned by his analysis of the ‘rare’ 
political processes he repeatedly returns to (Ts 6). In Conditions (1992), Badiou does in 
fact criticize his earlier position in Théorie du sujet: ‘Today, I would no longer say ‘every 
subject is political’, which is still a maxim of suturing. I would rather say: ‘every subject 
is induced by a generic procedure, and thus depends on an event. which is why the sub-
ject is rare’.2 It is not clear, however, whether this amounts to a retraction of the form of 
subjectivation which was originally understood solely politically—subjects were already 
‘rare’ in Théorie du sujet, for example.
however, in the earlier work, Badiou’s thought itself does precisely circulate around 
a certain collection of names and knowledges: Marxism, Badiou argues, ‘is the discourse 
that supports the proletariat as subject. This is a principle we must never abandon’. 
despite his separation of proletariat from the working class, the fact that Badiou sets up 
a name as a ‘principle’ can be retroactively criticized from the standpoint of his later 
work as overdetermining that which is left undecided and unseen in the later formula-
1. cf. peter hallward’s claim that ‘In Badiou’s early work, the mechanism of this subjectivation is exclusively 
political’., A Subject to Truth, p. 5.
2. alain Badiou, Conditions, paris, seuil, 1992, p. 2, n. 1.
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tion of a political event. The political question in the early work is ‘what is the organic 
link between the masses in revolt—the decisive historical actor—and the party, as con-
stituted political subject?’ It is this notion of an ‘organic link’ that marks Badiou out 
as essentially vanguardist in his conception of the political subject at this point, albeit 
a vanguardism that oscillates with regards to who the ‘subject’ is: there is an inherent 
ambiguity about who is the true subject in this situation—the party or the proletariat? 
or a fusion of the two? as hallward puts it: ‘[t]he subjective, or historical, “topology” 
of partisan antagonism explodes the static algebra of class … whereas every object 
stays in its place, every subject violates its place, inasmuch as its essential virtue is to 
be disoriented. subjectivism operates in the element of force whereby place … finds 
itself altered’. yet it is not an unmediated proletariat that seeks to abolish the ‘space of 
placement’ of classes. on the contrary, ‘It is only through the party that the (objectively) 
working class becomes revolutionary subject … the masses make history, but as vanish-
ing or ephemeral; the party makes this very vanishing consist and endure’.5 as well as a 
response to sartre’s problems of the ‘fleetingness’ of the group-in-fusion, as outlined in 
The Critique of  Dialectical Reason, there is a presentiment of Badiou’s later ‘faithful subjects’ 
in the role he assigns to the party in this earlier work: ‘the initial univocal act, which is 
always localized, inaugurates a fidelity, i.e. an invention of consequences, that will prove 
to be as infinite as the situation itself ’.6 In this sense, we could say that Badiou’s attempt 
to make fidelity an on-going process, rather than a simple declaration mutates from 
donating to the party a vanguardist role to a retention of this same form in later non-
political and more generically political conceptions of the subject. Badiou’s criticism 
in Théorie du sujet of mass movements without a party is furthermore extremely close to 
lenin’s criticisms of ‘spontaneity’ and his centralizing of the party in What is to be Done?: 
‘We must take upon ourselves the task of organizing … an all-sided political struggle 
under the leadership of our party that all and sundry oppositional strata could … give 
assistance to this struggle and this party according to their capacities’.7 Indeed, Badiou 
is adamant in his defence of lenin’s affirmation of the subjective aspect of politics, and 
in fact argues against the common claim that lenin delegates too much strength to the 
party: ‘for lenin, the party is nothing but the … mandatory focal point for a politics. 
The party is the active purification of politics, the system of possibility practiced through 
the assessment of the commune. It is inferred from politics (from the subjective aspect 
of force)’ (Ts 6). later Badiou could not be more explicit in his turn away from the 
logic of the party, however: ‘the question worth highlighting is one of a politics without 
party, which in no sense means unorganized, but rather one organized through the intel-
. alain Badiou, ‘jean-paul sartre’ (pamphlet), paris, potemkine, 1980, p. 7.
. hallward, A Subject to Truth, p. 5.
5. hallward, A Subject to Truth, p. 6
6. alain Badiou, ‘eight Theses on the universal’, Theoretical Writings, ed. and trans. ray Brassier and al-
berto Toscano, london, ny, continuum, 200, p. 150.
7. V. I. lenin, What is to be Done?, trans. s.V. and patricia utechin, oxford, oxford university press, 196, 
p. 128.
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lectual discipline of political processes, and not according to a form correlated with that 
of the state’. (M 122). 
This earlier recourse to the party is Badiou’s response to the problem shared by 
rousseau and sartre, as noted above, namely, how to preserve over time the initial mo-
ment of the subjective realization of revolution (for sartre it is in some sense hopeless; for 
rousseau, politics becomes a question of legitimation). Indeed, Badiou makes it clear in 
Théorie du sujet that his conceptualization of the party is precisely the ‘subject’ (however 
unclear its relation to the proletariat whose struggle it carries) that preserves the initial 
moment of force: ‘The party is something subjective, taken in its historical emergence, 
the network of its actions, the novelty it concentrates. The institution is nothing but a 
husk’ (Ts 59). again, Badiou is very close to sartre on this point (although for sartre 
there is no question of ‘the party’ preserving the initial moment of revolt)—the ossifica-
tion of force into institutions is not the framework that preserves the initial moment of 
novelty: here we see why Badiou must maintain the centrality of the ‘subjective’—struc-
tures and organization are not enough if their participants are not gripped by the motive 
force that catalysed their initial movement. placing, institutionalizing, is always on the 
side of the objective: ‘every force is … a subjective force, and inasmuch as it is assigned 
to its place, structured, splaced, it is an objective force’ (Ts 59).
In later Badiou, this question will mutate into a more historically reflexive, again 
more sartrean, and, we should say, less rhetorically leninist, one: ‘why do the most 
heroic popular uprisings, the most persistent wars of liberation, the most indisputable 
mobilisations in the name of justice and liberty end … in opaque statist constructions 
wherein none of the factors that gave meaning and possibility to their historical genesis 
is decipherable?’ (M 70) as hallward puts it:
what has happened in Badiou’s subsequent work is that he has slowly adopted, 
while struggling to maintain his strictly political principles, a perspective similar to 
sartre’s historical-ephemeral pessimism. … but whereas sartre was able to move 
beyond the ephemeral only by equating an ultimate historical coherence with a 
global political coordination—which accounts for the failure of the second volume 
of his Critique to move beyond stalin as the apparent end of history—Badiou’s 
determination to avoid this alternative has driven him ever further toward the 
radical subtraction of politics from history altogether.8
The rhetoric of the party leads Badiou in the earlier work to preserve a ‘pure’ aspect 
of the proletariat amidst its ‘contradictory unity’ as the ‘practical’ working class (in the 
historical context, to differentiate the Marxist-leninist and Maoist movements from the 
pcf). If Théorie du sujet considers the party the only effective organizational structure, 
later Badiou will, on the contrary, turn his back completely on the necessity of the pro-
letariat-party movement: ‘the balance of the twentieth century is the withering away of 
the party-form, which knows only the form of the party-state’.9 we can again note this 
8. hallward, A Subject to Truth, p. .
9. La Distance Politique, no 5, 2001.
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move as the shift from a conception of party as subject to the idea of ‘politics without 
a party’ (the latter in fact being the maxim behind Badiou’s work with l’organization 
politique).
Badiou’s later conception of the subject uncouples its relation to the proletariat in fa-
vour of a more generic conception of humanity, what he calls ‘polyvalent man’: ‘the real 
characteristic of the party is not its firmness, but rather its porosity to the event … what 
needs to come about is nothing but the affirmative multiplicity of capacities, whose em-
blem is polyvalent man, who undoes even those secular connections that bring together 
intellectual workers on the one hand, and manual workers on the other’. (M 75). This 
radical lack of political specification indicates a perhaps surprising turn to pre-Marxist 
considerations, at least partly on the basis of real historical failures, and aligns Badiou 
more with a feuerbachian lineage than a strictly politically Marxist-leninist one. This 
is particularly the case with Badiou’s transition from the rhetoric of ‘destruction’ to the 
axiomatic assertion that ‘people think … politics is a thought’ (Ts 6). The rationalist 
philosophical universality of Badiou’s newer conception of politics removes the antago-
nism of the earlier work between the proletariat and the bourgeois world, but precisely 
at the expense of a Marxist analysis of the structure of capitalism. The later theory of 
the subject is ahistorically affixed to the notion of event, and less to the topology of the 
proletariat/bourgeois relation: ‘If one were to identify a cause of the subject, one would 
have to return, not so much to truth, which is rather its stuff, nor to the infinity whose 
finitude it is, but rather to the event’ (Be ). The ‘event’ of politics will, however, 
subtract Badiou’s subject from a structured analysis, not only of capitalism, but also 
from ‘worldy’ politics altogether. This later subject (political and otherwise) is ultimately 
characterized more by what it is not than by what it is—neither the existential place of a 
set of representations, nor the transcendental system of the constitution of objects of pos-
sible experience. It is a subtractive entity, a ‘fragment’ of ‘collective humanity’ that ar-
guably remains wedded, because of Badiou’s later theoretically pre-Marxist turn, to the 
problem of sustaining the original political impulse behind mass movements, and thus 
again to the sartrean problem of the depressing ossification of the group-in-fusion. The 
subject’s exemption from a philosophy of history perhaps avoids some of the problems 
of sartre’s progressive-regressive method, which ultimately sees the totality of history re-
fracted in the life of a single individual, but brings with it its own problems, namely, how 
we are to understand the relation between the structure of the political subject/collective 
and the state of affairs more broadly, not to mention historical forces and tendencies. 
It was briefly noted above that Badiou’s later ‘theory of the subject’ uncouples the 
term from a strictly political affiliation and broadens its possible points of reference to 
other ‘conditions’, namely art, science and love, as well as politics. nevertheless, the 
structure of the political subject in the later works (Being and Event and the collection of 
essays uniquely devoted to his more recent position on politics, Metapolitics from 1998) 
has its own specificity that Badiou is clear to delineate: ‘every situation is ontologically 
infinite. But only politics summons this infinity immediately, as subjective universality’ 
(M 1). If Badiou has delinked this newer conception of the political subject from ques-
cosMos and hIsTory20
tions of antagonism and terms such as proletariat, as it seems clear he has, what is the 
status of this ‘subjective universality’? In a sense, Badiou is deliberately vague, perhaps 
in part to atone for the overly polemical thrust of his earlier work. for example when 
he claims the following: ‘In collective situations—in which the collective becomes inter-
ested in itself—politics (if it exists as generic politics: what was called, for a long time, revo-
lutionary politics, and for which another word must be found today) is also a procedure 
of fidelity … its infinite productions are indiscernible (in particular, they do not coincide 
with any part nameable according to the State), being nothing more than “changes” of political 
subjectivity within the situation’. (Be 0). The admission that ‘another word must be 
found today’ indicates the difficulty Badiou has in trying differentiate his own project 
both from that of Marxist-leninism and from that of the lineage of political humanism 
(feuerbach and the early Marx, as well as parts of the later sartre) that has character-
ized much of twentieth-century political thought. despite stressing Badiou’s relationship 
to the trajectory of thought that concerns itself with the generic in politics, we must be a 
little wary of trying neatly to fit Badiou back into a lineage of humanism which he seems 
to ignore or repudiate, or of neglecting the historical and political circumstances of the 
impossibility of an unproblematic usage of the term ‘humanism’ in a period when its 
invocation implied devastating inhumanity in practice (stalinism). as further noted in 
the introduction, a key component of Badiou’s contemporary criticisms of the discourses 
of ‘human rights’ and his attack on the inherent ‘victimization’ of man in contemporary 
ethical discourse in the Ethics is the defence of those french thinkers that we would typi-
cally characterize as ‘anti-humanist’—althusser, foucault and lacan. for Badiou, in 
what is only seemingly a paradox, these attempts to think beyond ‘man’ and ‘without’ 
man remain among the most politically emancipatory available to us. however, it seems 
clear that whilst Badiou is faithful to foucault in some sense, and to the explicit prob-
lematic of foucault’s The order of  Things, i.e. that the historical emergence of the very 
posing of ‘man’ as a problem and the empirico-transcendental overcodings that inevita-
bly follow is due for surpassing, nevertheless this argument is not taken up in the same 
way for foucault as for Badiou. Pace foucault, it seems that for Badiou there is a differ-
ent way of both asking and answering the question of what man is that manages to ob-
viate the temptation of post-Kantian (transcendental or naturalist) answers. so, despite 
having gone through the filter of theoretical anti-humanism, the question itself—‘what 
is man?’—remains in place for him in the political context. politics, however, becomes 
something of an autonomous region, tied to the situation, but oddly distanced from 
larger tendencies and geopolitical processes: ‘politics is, for itself, its own proper end; in 
the mode of what is being produced as true statements—though forever un-known—by 
the capacity of a collective will’ (Be 5). If philosophy’s task vis-à-vis politics (as with 
the other truth conditions) is to gather together the ‘truths’ revealed in situations, we can 
in fact retroactively use the early Badiou to criticize the later. when in Théorie du sujet 
he states that ‘[a] sum of rebellions does not make a subject, regardless of how much 
you may want to “coordinate” them’ (Ts 62), do we not see a kind of pre-emptive self-
critique of the later work? If philosophy’s task is to ‘compossibilize’, to hold together, the 
nIna power 205
truths emergent under the four different conditions (whilst possessing none of its own), 
then what distinguishes philosophy’s capture of these episodes of non-antagonistic, non-
historical, generic manifestations of politics precisely from this ‘sum of rebellions’? 
In the later writings on metapolitics, we confront the possibility that that depend-
ency on ‘thought’ to found the possibility of politics may cause problems from within the 
system. Badiou makes use of two axioms, in particular, that ultimately seem to occupy 
a floating role between the set-theoretical ontology, on the one hand, and the discus-
sion of events and truth procedures, on the other. These are, first, the axiom of equality, 
namely that: ‘equality is not an objective for action, it is an axiom of action’.50 second, 
the generic axiom that ‘man thinks’ or ‘people think’, namely that: ‘philosophy addresses 
all humans as thinking beings since it supposes that all humans think’.51 whilst these 
seem at minimal or almost banal assertions, without them Badiou could not preserve 
his commitment to what he calls a modern politics of emancipation. The connection be-
tween the genericity, equality and politics is basically outlined in the following claim: 
some political orientations, throughout history, have had or will have a connection 
with a truth. a truth of the collective as such. They are rare attempts, often brief, but 
they are the only ones under condition philosophy can think about. These political 
sequences are singularities, they trace no destiny, they construct no monumental 
history. philosophy can, however, distinguish in them a common feature. This 
feature is that these orientations require of the people they engage only their strict 
generic humanity. They give no preference, for the principles of action, to the 
particularity of interests. These political orientations induce a representation of 
the collective capacity which refers its agents to the strictest equality. what does 
‘equality’ mean? equality means that the political actor is represented under the 
sole sign of his specifically human capacity. Interest is not a specifically human 
capacity. all living beings have as an imperative for survival the protection of 
their interests. The specifically human capacity is precisely thought, and thought 
is nothing other than that by which the path of a truth seizes and traverses the 
human animal.52 
The following question is important here: Is an anti-humanist fidelity to thought per se 
possible in Badiou, such that it can avoid any question of a specifically human capac-
ity from the outset? perhaps in the case of mathematics (i.e. Badiou’s set theoretical 
ontology) we can respond in the affirmative. however, when it comes to politics, this 
seems unlikely. The related question that needs to be posed here is the following: can 
Badiou ever truly sever ‘thought’ from a baseline, axiomatic notion of the human as 
equal and generic? Badiou’s entire project is founded on a commitment to political 
subjectivation—but subjectivation and generic humanity are not ontological facts, and 
50. here Badiou shares a similar conception with rancière, for whom equality is not an outcome to be 
desired, but an axiomatic supposition. 
51. alain Badiou, ‘philosophy and desire’, Infinite Thought, trans. and ed. oliver feltham and justin clemens, 
london, continuum, 200, p. 0.
52. alain Badiou, ‘philosophy and politics’, Radical Philosophy, 96, july/august 1999, p. 29.
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nothing guarantees their possibility. Indeed, events are strictly speaking impossible, or 
extra-ontological, given the logic of the situation (which is why Badiou refers to them as 
‘ultra-ones’). what, then, is the relation between what Badiou calls ‘generic humanity’, 
the axiom that ‘man thinks’, and man’s capacity for immortality and infinity as a collec-
tive political subject? we could perhaps say that at least one ‘meta-event’ conditions the 
very existence of these two non-mathematical axioms—not the existence of philosophy, 
but rather the existence of politics, of events that once contained political ‘truths’ (Badiou 
repeatedly refers to the french and russian revolutions). furthermore, without the two 
floating axioms of equality and generic thought, politics would not even be thinkable, 
and certainly not the egalitarian forms of politics which Badiou in his later works tries 
to defend.5 
If the capacity that is specifically human is that of thought, and, as Badiou argues, 
‘thought is nothing other than that by which the path of a truth seizes and traverses the 
human animal’,5 we may wish to ask what the status of this traversing is. The answer 
seems to be that the path of a truth enables that which is inhuman to be borne by the 
generic thinking of man. But this thought in some sense pre-exists the traversing, via the 
axiom that ‘man thinks’, and that man has the capacity to think disinterestedly. why 
disinterestedly? for Badiou, interest is not a specifically human capacity, since all living 
beings protect their interests as imperative for survival. Thought as traversed by truth—
this peculiarly human capacity—must be capable of being absolutely disinterested. Ba-
diou writes: ‘any truth procedure distinguishes a properly immortal disinterest from an 
abject properly “animal” assemblage of particular interests’. furthermore, thought and 
disinterest coincide in the overcoming of all that is finite in man: ‘Thought is the specific 
mode by which a human animal is traversed and overcome by a truth’ (e 16). The rela-
tionship of philosophy to politics that comes to take a central role in Badiou’s later work 
takes a historical and theoretical step backwards by replacing the question of political 
practice with this more general conception of thought: ‘By “metapolitics” I mean what-
ever consequences a philosophy is capable of drawing … from real instances of politics 
as thought’ (inscription from M xxxix). There is a potential problem here, aside from 
the obscured yet apparently necessary philosophical anthropology, if politics is reduced 
to something like noology, a mere examination of its rational qualities. 
paradoxically, then, it has to be the case that for the later Badiou, it is the generic 
human capacity for thought that minimally founds a universal inhumanism—and this is 
the key role of both politics and mathematics. But in order to link this back to the condi-
tion of politics we should ask the following question: does our capacity for mathematics 
in any sense relate to the fact that we can be seized by specifically political truths? whilst 
this might sound like an impossible question from Badiou’s point of view, a mixture of 
5. rather than try and force Badiou’s mathematical analysis of the generic onto levels of thinking to which 
it cannot apply, it should be pointed out that it is he himself who uses the language of the generic, outside 
of its specifically technical role, in order to found the very possibility of politics (separate from philosophy), 
as well as in his discussions of generic humanity tout court.
5. Badiou, Infinite Thought, p. 71.
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two distinct conditions, it directly interrogates the role of infinity in Badiou’s philosophy. 
If it is mathematics that teaches us that there is no reason whatsoever to confine thinking 
within the ambit of finitude, and yet it is man’s capacity to be traversed by the infinite 
that is immediately relevant to any thinking of politics, rather than mathematics, then 
it seems that we cannot avoid posing what at first appears to be an illegitimate ques-
tion.55 
If every politics of emancipation rejects finitude, rejects ‘being-towards-death’ on 
the basis of the immediate subjective universality of the infinite, then it seems clear that, 
paradoxically, infinity is just as, if not more, important for a politics of emancipation 
than it is for mathematics. But what is the relation between infinity and immortality? 
In the Ethics we are told that every human being is capable of being this immortal, that 
‘in each case, subjectivation is immortal, and makes Man’ (e 12). This is why there is no 
ethics in general, and no politics in general. all humanity has its root in the identifica-
tion in thought [en pensée] of singular situations. If infinity is actually only the most gen-
eral form of multiple-being, then human capacity for infinity is perhaps the most banal 
of starting points. nevertheless it plays the founding role for politics more than for any 
other condition, including mathematics itself. In ‘politics as Truth procedure’, Badiou 
writes the following: ‘The infinite comes into play in every truth procedure, but only 
in politics does it take the first place. This is because only in politics is the deliberation 
about the possible (and hence about the infinity of the situation) constitutive of the proc-
ess itself … politics treats the infinite as such according to the principle of the same, the 
egalitarian principle. we will say that the numericality of the political procedure has the 
infinite as its first term; whereas for love this first term is the one; for science the void; 
and for art a finite number’.56 
let us digress slightly here, and look briefly at feuerbach, in order to go over the 
role that the generic plays in his thought, and to make sense of its relation to politics in 
Badiou. In a section of The Essence of  Christianity entitled ‘The essential nature of Man’, 
feuerbach tells us that ‘consciousness in the strictest sense is present only in a being to 
whom his species, his essential nature, is an object of thought’.57 In the ‘strictest sense’ 
here excludes ‘brutes’ who can only conceive of themselves as individuals and not in 
a generic sense. There is seemingly nothing unusual in feuerbach’s definition of con-
sciousness; we are familiar with the argument that because man is by nature in posses-
sion of both inner and outer life, we can differentiate ourselves from other animals that 
apparently lack this separation. however, feuerbach dislocates the role nature usually 
55. cf. Badiou’s ‘on the Truth-process: an open lecture’, where he argues that: ‘the modern politics of 
emancipation freed from the dialectic scheme of classes and parties has as its aim something like a generic 
democracy, a promotion of the commonplace, of a quality abstracted from any predicate—so it’s possible 
to speak of a generic politics, and a warfield of prose such as samuel Beckett’s, which tried by successive 
subtraction to designate the naked existence of generic humanity’ (august 2002, http://www.egs.edu/fac-
ulty/badiou/badiou-truth-process-2002.htm). 
56. Badiou, Theoretical Writings. 
57. ludwig feuerbach, The Essence of  Christianity, trans. george eliot, new york, london, harper and row, 
1957, p. 1.
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plays in this equation (as that relating to the outer life, outside of consciousness), and 
states instead that: ‘the inner life of man is the life which has relation to his species, to 
his general, as distinguished from his individual, nature’. so, to be ‘individual’ is to be an 
external, natural being, like the brute who can ‘exercise no function which has relation 
to its species without another individual external to itself ’. To be conscious in the ‘strict-
est sense’, on the other hand, is to be universal, by virtue of the very fact that man can 
‘perform the functions of thought and speech, which strictly imply such a relation, apart 
from another individual’. Thus man’s very essence, his gattungswesen, depends on his ca-
pacity for universal, abstractive, activity, even (especially) in his isolation (his inner life). 
paradoxically, Man’s capacity for ‘asceticism’ (understood here as the reflection of 
thought upon thought, or upon the very capacity for thought) is that which most indi-
cates his universality. feuerbach, in his thinking of man’s ‘inner life’ as gattungswesen, 
inaugurates a strand of philosophical anthropology that has nothing to do with the 
equation of interiority with finitude, by which thought comes to reflect upon its own 
limits, and ultimately the possibility of its own absolute impossibility (as in heidegger’s 
explicitly anti-anthropological formulation). on the contrary, thought qua thought is 
always based on a demonstration of the infinity of thought, and thus simultaneously of 
man’s ‘generic essence’. here are two quotes from feuerbach that demonstrate this point 
a little further, the first from the preface to on the Essence of  Christianity, and the second 
from ‘Towards a critique of hegel’s philosophy’:
consciousness, in the strict or proper sense, is identical with consciousness of the 
infinite; a limited consciousness is no consciousness; consciousness is essentially 
infinite in its nature. The consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the 
consciousness of the infinity of the consciousness; or, in the consciousness of the 
infinite, the conscious subject has for its object the infinity of his own nature.58
The human form is … the genus of the manifold animal species; it no longer exists as 
man but as genus. The being of man is no longer particular and subjective, but a univer-
sal being, for man has the whole universe as the object of his drive for knowledge.59
returning to Badiou, we must of course point out the quite distinct roles that uni-
versality and consciousness play for him—such that universality can in no way precede 
an event, and that consciousness plays no part in his radically anti-phenomenological 
formulations. But what is clear in feuerbach is that maintaining a generic thinking of 
infinity as a constitutively human capacity is the only way to escape the over-determina-
tion of man by his finitude. hence feuerbach’s philosophical anthropology has nothing 
to do with limiting thought, and in fact, precisely points to a radically de-individualized 
generic ability to think the infinite which looks to be very close to the claims Badiou 
makes in his later conception of politics.
however, Badiou differs from feuerbach here in more complex ways. first, by hav-
58. ludwig feuerbach, The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of  Ludwig Feuerbach, ed. and trans. Zawar hanfi, new 
york, anchor Books, 1972, p. 99.
59. feuerbach, The Fiery Brook, p. 9.
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ing a singular, and not a general, conception of the universal (which also separates him 
on this specific point from Kant and the transcendental tradition). Thus, when it comes 
to ethics there can be no general principle of human rights, ‘for the simple reason that 
what is universally human is always rooted in particular truths, particular configurations 
of active thought’. similarly, ‘politics as thinking has no other objective than the trans-
formation of unrepeatable situations’ (e 16). To become a subject (and not remain a 
simple ‘human animal’), is to participate in the coming into being of a universal novelty. 
The subject here will be singular because it will always be an event that constitutes 
the subject as a truth. however, to return to the axiom of equality, it is important that 
equality does not refer to anything objective. equality is subjective, or revealed through 
subjectivity, and it is this key claim that links both Badiou and feuerbach, aside from 
the question of the generic. 
politics, as we have seen, is impossible without the idea that people, taken indis-
tinctly, are capable of the thought that also constitutes the post-evental political subject. 
But at what point are people capable of this thought? It is my claim that, in the case of 
politics, Badiou needs to found, at an absolutely minimal level, a kind of pre-evental 
philosophical anthropology of a quasi-feuerbachian kind. This is something of a prob-
lematic position, cutting directly against arguments made elsewhere by others, includ-
ing Badiou himself, and peter hallward, who states explicitly that ‘there is no distinct 
place in Badiou’s work for a philosophical anthropology of any kind’.60 certainly, there 
is no room in Badiou for any philosophical anthropology of finitude. The question here 
is whether one can have a philosophical anthropology of infinitude, as Badiou seems 
to require for his discussion of politics. That is why asking this question returned us to 
feuerbach. The anthropological aspect of the answer to this question would have to be 
empty, generic, unlimited. In other words, that claim that we are ‘subtractively infinite’ 
means that what we do as subjects, without any reference to an object, has infinity as its 
dimension. That we are infinite because we think infinitely, or in feuerbachian terms, 
because we think infinity as such. 
The reason for this incursion into the (mostly uncharted) territory of an infinite 
philosophical anthropology is that, without some kind of discussion of a pre-evental 
generic capacity, or an empty axiomatic regarding the thought of all, it seems that Ba-
diou would be incapable of claiming that the events which set off the truth procedure of 
politics have any reason to be more or less egalitarian. It could be the case that there are 
no subjects until an event and its nomination, but without the generic axioms of univer-
sal thought underlying the very possibility of subjectivation, there would be no positive 
content to Badiou’s defense of emancipatory, egalitarian politics. 
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